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Introduction 
Despite being a beneficiary of European funds with a high level of public support 
for European integration, Poland is reluctant to accept some EU policies and pro-
posals for joint actions. One example of this might be its contestation of the pos-
sible creation of a common European Union (EU) migration policy, as well as 
opposition to mandatory quotas in the refugee relocation programme proposed by 
the EU in 2016. It seems that the rise of populism and Euroscepticism is fuelling 
anti-European stances, bringing xenophobic discourse into the mainstream of 
politics and strengthening anti-immigration rhetoric. It is possible for this to hap-
pen as the Europeanisation process in Poland is far from complete, and discontent 
with the transformation and liberal order is overlapping with disappointment with 
politics in general. 
In this paper I will present a general background of Poland–EU relations re-
garding relocation of refugees and the proposal of joint actions in the area of 
common migration policy, as well as the arguments of the radical-right parties that 
contest these solutions. The first part of the paper will be devoted to the concept 
of populist radical right (PRR) and the parties in the Polish political arena that can 
be seen as part of the PRR family. In the second part I will analyse the way populist 
radical-right parties in Poland are using the migration crisis in order to present 
their views on the future of Europe and mobilise the electorate. Two parties and 
their rhetoric will be examined. The first one is the Congress of the New Right 
(Kongres Nowej Prawicy – KNP), which won four seats in the European Parliament 
elections of 2014 and is the only openly Euro-reject party in Poland, to use the 
classification proposed by Kopecký and Mudde.1 The second grouping presented is 
                                                     
1 Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, “Explaining Different Paths of Democratization: The Czech 
and Slovak Republics”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 16/3 (2002): 63-84.  
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Kukiz’15, which gained 8.81% of votes in the 2015 parliamentary election (cooper-
ating with the far-right National Movement). The party claims that Islam is a dan-
ger to the cultural (Catholic) Polish identity, and calls asylum seekers “culturally 
foreign”. Kukiz’15 is calling for a referendum on the refugee quotas that the EC 
proposed to introduce in 2015. The main aim of the paper is to analyse who is 
contesting the idea of redistribution of refugees around all member states of the 
EU and why, as well as criticising the proposal of a common migration policy. 
After analysing the party documents and rhetoric of the leaders (during the period 
from March 2015 to October 2017), I argue that the rhetoric is demonstrating 
many stereotypes and stigmatisations that are used in the political discourse and 
political agenda, but also simplifications and fears that very often go deeper. Most 
visible are identity-based arguments, including the one claiming that if refugees are 
to be accepted they need to be “like us”. Security and economic fears are also visi-
ble, and used by the mentioned parties in order to consolidate the electorate and 
gain political capital.  
The migration crisis – the view from Poland 
Despite the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which was supposed to facili-
tate the establishment of the EU migration policy, member states are yet to come 
to an agreement. The refugee crisis, the apogee of which came in 2015, meant that 
the debates on the need for and shape of this joint policy returned with redoubled 
force. Owing to the Brexit negotiations, of great importance to all member states, 
as well as the signing of the EU-Turkey refugee deal and the relatively smaller 
number of refugees arriving in Europe, this topic has become much less frequent 
in the public discourse. Yet the problem has not gone away – such states as Italy, 
which struggle to cope with the largest number of arrivals on account of their loca-
tion, are continuing to appeal for constructive solutions at EU level as well as the 
support of other member states. A response to these appeals was supposed to 
come in the form of the refugee relocation system, which assumes that each Euro-
pean Union member state will accept a specific number of refugees. This number 
was to be calculated on the basis of a given country’s wealth and population. Yet 
this solution was criticised in several member states – especially the Visegrad 
Group and Austria. In May 2016, the European Commission (EC) announced 
financial penalties for those countries that fail to meet their designated quota of 
refugees. The Polish government consistently refuses to satisfy this requirement, 
and criticises the relocation programme. 
The issue of accepting refugees became the subject of heated political debate 
in Poland in 2015, particularly between the parties Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic 
Platform (PO). During its time in government until 2015, PO initially rejected the 
possibility of accepting refugees, before agreeing to Poland’s admitting around 
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7,000 relocated individuals.2 The PiS government rescinded this decision after 
coming to power in October 2015, citing security issues and Poland’s engagement 
in helping refugees from war-affected areas in Ukraine. They made it clear that, 
especially after the terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris, Poland was unable to 
accept any refugees who might represent a danger to citizens’ safety. 
Poland was not the only country that did not agree to the quotas set by the 
EC, consistently refusing to accept even the smallest number of refugees. In light 
of this refusal, in December 2017 the EC decided to refer Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic to the European Court of Justice. 
The migration crisis has been the subject of debates in the Polish parliament, 
including, notably, two important speeches on 16 September 2015, by Prime Min-
ister Ewa Kopacz and PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński. These addresses resonated in 
the media, with the arguments the two leaders invoked, such as fear of the Islami-
sation of Europe, becoming a permanent fixture in the public discourse. In Octo-
ber 2016, the Polish parliament’s European Affairs Committee proposed a resolu-
tion concerning compulsory relocation of refugees. According to this resolution, 
the European Parliament and EU Council decree on the mechanism of mandatory 
relocation of refugees does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity described 
in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union.3 This resolution reflects the domi-
nant mood in Polish society, the vast majority of which does not support the idea 
of accepting refugees – according to a public opinion poll carried out in December 
2017 by CBOS, 63% of respondents do not agree to Poland accepting refugees 
from countries where military conflicts are taking place, 33% are of the opposite 
view, and 4% do not have an opinion.4 
Poland’s refusal to accept refugees has been widely discussed not only within 
EU institutions, but also in domestic and international media. A common question 
has been why a state whose citizens have often been forced into emigration (during 
communism, for example), but also who emigrate en masse in search of better 
living and working conditions, dissociates itself so unequivocally from the idea of 
showing solidarity in sharing a problem faced by certain member states. The aver-
sion to refugees is often explained by fears over their cultural and religious differ-
ences. Interestingly, there has been hardly any mention in the discussion of the 
issues resulting from the direct experience Poland had in the 1990s when admitting 
several tens of thousands of Chechens. As Muslims, these refugees might also have 
been perceived as a threat to Polish identity, yet this argument also failed to appear 
                                                     
2 Refugees in Poland, facts and myths, URL: https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/
aktualnosci/uchodzcy-w-polsce-fakty-i-mity.html (accessed 8 December 2017). 
3 The Sejm committee against the mechanism of mandatory relocation of refugees, URL: 
http://www.parlamentarny.pl/wydarzenia/sejmowa-komisja-przeciw-mechanizmowi-przymusowej-
relokacji-uchodzcow,16007.html (accessed 8 December 2017). 
4 CBOS, Stosunek do przyjmowania uchodźców (“Attitude towards accepting refugees”), no. 
163/2017. 
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in the Polish public debate of the time. The refugee question appears to have be-
come politicised, and is used, albeit in different ways, by all political factions. The 
political discourse is divided into camps – those who call upon Poland to carry out 
its duties resulting from solidarity with other EU member states, but also its Chris-
tian duty, and those who refuse to accept refugees, citing the need to defend the 
Christian Polish identity from the influx of Islam. 
The Polish populist radical right 
Defining a party of the populist radical right causes a number of problems, mostly 
because the very concept of populism is broad and vague, and can be used by dif-
fering ideological groups. Researchers point to the characteristics of populism, 
which claims the right to represent “the people”, contrasting it usually with the 
corrupt elites,5 thus creating two antagonistic groups within society. Ivan Krastev, 
meanwhile, explains that “the priority given to building capitalism over building 
democracy is at the heart of the current rise of democratic illiberalism in Central 
and Eastern Europe”.6 In part, Polish populism, as in other countries of the re-
gion, is characterised not by right-wing or left-wing rhetoric, but nationalist dis-
course, proclaiming the need to revisit the period of transformation.7 At the same 
time, most researchers agree that populist rhetoric appeals to citizens’ fears and 
frustrations, exploiting their unfamiliarity with how the mechanisms of politics 
function. For the purposes of this article, I will use Cas Mudde’s definition of the 
populist radical right, which stresses that for populists, politics should express the 
volonté générale – the will of the people as the supreme value.8 
In analysing the radical right, it is important to emphasise the characteristics 
that distinguish it from the extreme right. Above all, the radical right criticises the 
existing democratic system; it is not anti-system as such, though, as it operates 
within the system and accepts its rules. Radical-right parties are usually anti-
European and oppose the trends of modernisation. According to Roger Griffin, 
the radical right is also characterised by aversion to individualism, as well as to 
upholding human rights (and especially minority rights).9 Mudde underlines that 
the radical right is characterised by nationalism and xenophobia, and also places an 
5 Andreas Schelder, “Anti-Political Establishment Parties”, Party Politics, 2/3(1996); Margaret 
Canovan, “Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy”, Political Studies, 47,1 (1999) 
also in Paul Taggart, Populism, Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000. 
6 Ivan Krastev, “The strange death of the liberal consensus”, Journal of Democracy, 18,4 (2007). 
7 Radosław Markowski, “Populizm a demokracja: ujęcia, dylematy, kontrowersje”, in Radosław 
Markowski (ed.) Populizm a demokracja, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo ISP PAN, 2004, 23-24. 
8 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Parties in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 23 
9 Roger Griffin, “Afterword: last rights?”, in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), The Radical Right in Central 
and Eastern Europe since 1989, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. 
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emphasis on law and order, in order to construct a monocultural state.10 It is note-
worthy that in ethnically homogeneous countries such as Poland, where ethnic 
divides are practically invisible, right-wing parties rally against the enemy in the 
form of incomers – immigrants, people of a different religion or value system. 
Lenka Bustikova notes that, paradoxically, the mobilisation of the radical right in 
Eastern Europe against refugees “westernized the eastern European radical right in 
the opposition to Islam and migrants”.11 The tendency of mainstream parties (such 
as PiS and Fidesz in Hungary) to adopt some of the demands of radical-right 
groupings also causes problems with the classification of parties of the radical 
right.12 The populist radical right is therefore a complex concept that is hard to 
define. Mudde points out that the radical right is a form of nationalism, yet where-
as all radical-right parties are nationalist, not all nationalists are part of the radical 
right.13 Similarly, not every radical-right party is populist. In this article, I am only 
interested in the relevant parties of the radical populist right currently active on the 
Polish political scene – the Kukiz’15 movement, which invited activists from the 
National Movement to be on its lists, and the Congress of the New Right, present 
in the European Parliament (as well as the splinter party KORWiN/Liberty).  
 
Table 1: Polish elections 2014-2015  
 
Political party 2014  
European parliament 
elections  
2015  
Parliamentary elections 
Civic Platform  
(Platforma Obywatelska) 
32.13% 24.09 % 
Polish Peasant Party 
(Polskie Stronnictwo 
Ludowe) 
6.8% 
 
5.13 % 
Law and Justice 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) 
31.78% 
 
37.58 % 
Democratic Left Alliance 
– Labour Union 
(Sojusz Lewicy Demo-
kratycznej – Unia Pracy) 
9.44% - 
Kukiz’15  - 8.81 % 
                                                     
10 Cas Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right, Manchester–New York: Manchester University 
Press, 2000, 177 
11 Lenka Bustikova, “The Radical Right in Eastern Europe”, in: Jens Rydgren (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Radical Right, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 
12 Cas Mudde, The Study of Populist Radical Right Parties: Towards a Fourth Wave, C-Rex working pa-
per series, 1(2016), University of Oslo. 
13 Cas Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right, op. cit., 30. 
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Congress of the New 
Right (Kongres Nowej 
Prawicy) 
7.15% - 
Modern 
(Nowoczesna) 
- 7.60% 
Source: National Electoral Commission www.pkw.gov.pl 
Congress of the New Right and KORWiN-Liberty 
The party founded by Janusz Korwin-Mikke in 2010 is the continuation of his 
political activities stretching back to the beginning of the democratic transfor-
mation in Poland. The founders of the Congress of the New Right were activists 
of the party Liberty and Lawfulness (Wolność i Praworządność), as well as politicians 
of the Real Politics Union (Unia Polityki Realnej). The party is conservative-liberal 
and Euro-hostile, advocating the abolition of the European Union. The Congress 
of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy) programme declares that it is the “only 
consistently and uncompromisingly anti-EU party in Poland”.14 In economic is-
sues, the party calls for far-reaching liberalism, declaring a market free from any 
intervention as a foundation of economic progress. In ideological questions, the 
KNP is a conservative party that stresses the Latin roots of European civilisation, 
and criticises civil partnerships, abortion and IVF, as well as the policy of multicul-
turalism. Until 2015, the face of the party was its leader, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, and 
its rhetoric is viewed as controversial, containing xenophobic and anti-Semitic 
elements and with a view of history based on conspiracy theories. 
The party electorate comprises mostly young people, generally residents of 
large cities, 75% of them men.15 The Congress employed new media to conduct an 
effective campaign targeted particularly at young voters. In the European Parlia-
ment elections in 2014, it achieved a result of 7.15%, taking fourth place and win-
ning four seats. Notably, the party’s result among Poles voting abroad was consid-
erably better than at home. In Ireland, it gained some 39.36% of valid votes, in the 
United Kingdom 37%, and in Iceland 30.25%.16 Some analysts have argued that 
the KNP electorate is made up of so-called protest votes which the party managed 
to mobilise in 2014. Neither the party, nor its former leader in presidential elec-
tions, has yet been able to win a significant number of votes. In 2015 Korwin-
Mikke, the party founder and its most recognisable and active politician, founded a 
new party named KORWiN (an acronym of his name meaning Coalition for the 
Renewal of the Republic Liberty and Hope). It did not win any seats in the Polish 
14 Programme of the Congress of the New Right (2014). 
15 Adrian Koładka, “KW Kongres Nowej Prawicy”, in Michał Dulak (ed.), Wybory do Parlamentu 
Europejskiego w Polsce 2014, Kraków 2014, 72. 
16 Electoral results, National Election Commission, URL: http://pe2014.pkw.gov.pl
/pl/wyniki/gminy/view/149901 (accessed 6 December 2017). 
Styczyńska, Refugees Not Welcome 
 
 
81 
parliament, but retains two MEPs (one a member of the Europe of Freedom and 
Direct Democracy group, and the other unattached) elected from the KNP list, as 
well as one member of the lower house of the Polish parliament, the Sejm (elected 
from the Kukiz’15 list). In 2016, the KORWiN party changed its name to Liberty 
(Wolność), but the party structure and programme remain unchanged. 
Kukiz’15 
In formal terms, the Kukiz’15 movement is a parliamentary group in the eighth 
term of the Sejm, as well as an association constituting the structure of the move-
ment established by the musician Paweł Kukiz for the parliamentary elections in 
2015. The movement included members of the nationalistic National Movement 
and the All-Polish Youth, also a nationalist organisation invoking the tradition of a 
similar organisation operating in the inter-war period. In the 2015 presidential 
election, Kukiz received 20.8% of votes, putting him in third place.17 Owing to the 
ideological diversity of its members, the movement is characterised by an eclectic 
programme, in which the major points include the creation of single-member con-
stituencies, refusal to accept even the smallest number of refugees from Syria and 
other countries affected by war, and criticism of EU bureaucracy, as well as a pro-
posal to deregulate European law. At present, Kukiz’15 has 30 seats in the 460-
strong Sejm. 
In 2016, the Kukiz movement set up the website dzienreferendalny.pl (“refer-
endum day”), to promote the idea of a referendum on Poland’s acceptance of ref-
ugees. This idea stemmed from the belief that, as stated on the website, “The host 
in Poland at present is no other power, but the citizens. It is the citizens who 
should decide whether we allow anyone into our Homeland, and whom”.18 Along-
side the form for collecting signatures, the website also features a poll asking: “Are 
you in favour of Poland accepting refugees as part of the system of relocation in 
the European Union”. In Poland, the Sejm can decide to put a particular issue to 
referendum based on the initiative of citizens gaining the backing of at least 
500,000 people. Despite the involvement of various organisations in the collection 
of signatures (including fans of football clubs), as yet the minimum number has 
not been reached. 
 
  
                                                     
17 Presidential Election results 2015, National Election Commission, URL: 
http://prezydent2015.pkw.gov.pl/319_Pierwsze_glosowanie (accessed 7 December 2017). 
18 Referendum Day webpage, URL: http://dzienreferendalny.pl (accessed 6 December 2017). 
 Visions and Revisions of Europe 82 
“Refugees not welcome” – the rhetoric of the Polish populist radical right 
The system of relocation of refugees and proposals for EU-wide solutions to the 
migration crisis are contested at various levels – the most commonly raised issue is 
the threat to identity posed by incomers, and their associated religious and cultural 
differences, but economic issues and security are also important. 
The first rhetorical device used by politicians of the radical right concerns vo-
cabulary – in their speeches they seldom use the word “refugee”, replacing it with 
“immigrant”, “Islamic immigrant” or “economic migrant”. Their objective is to 
focus attention on the economic aspect of migration, and away from the question 
of war and political, ethnic and religious persecution. By highlighting economic 
aspects, they depict the European Union as a source of profits, and people trying 
to reach it are attributed with solely economic migrations. Robert Winnicki, leader 
of the National Movement, calls refugees “invaders”,19 arguing that refugees regis-
tered in Greece, for example, upon moving to another EU member state become 
merely economic migrants. It is worth mentioning that referring to new arrivals as 
false refugees took place in other European countries in the early 1990s with the 
inflow of immigrants from the East, when the idea of “undeserving asylum-
seekers” portrayed as “disguised economic migrants” appeared in the public dis-
course of the countries of the so-called old EU.20 
Analysis of the position of parties of the populist radical right reveals a host of 
references to economic issues. The politicians of these parties argue that Poland 
cannot afford to accept people arriving from the Middle East or Africa, and that 
the help offered by the European Union is minimal, sufficing for no more than a 
few months’ stay.21 The economic motives of refugees leaving, for example, Leba-
non and Turkey for EU states is also stressed; according to Kukiz’15, such indi-
viduals should be treated as economic immigrants.22 Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s stance 
is that refugees heading to Europe are attracted only by benefits: “if we were to 
abolish benefits, there wouldn’t be any people coming to Poland and the whole of 
Europe”.23 Korwin-Mikke also repeated his argument during a debate in the Euro-
pean Parliament on the European migration programme, emphasising that those 
19 “Manifestacja ‘Przeciw islamizacji Europy’. Winnicki: ‘To nie uchodźcy, to najeźdźcy’”, Polska 
The Times Warszawa, 7 February 2016, URL: http://www.polskatimes.pl/artykul/9371803,warszawa-
manifestacja-przeciw-islamizacji-europy-winnicki-to-nie-uchodzcy-to-najezdzcy-zdjecia,id,t.html 
(accessed 14 December 2017). 
20 Robin Cohen, Migration and its Enemies: Global Capital, Migrant Labour and the Nation-State. Alder-
shot: Ashgate, 2006, 88. 
21 Position of the Kukiz’15 movement on “refugees”, published on the Facebook page of Paweł 
Kukiz, 16 September 2015, URL: https://www.facebook.com/kukizpawel/posts/958933797507674 
(accessed 15 December 2017). 
22 Ibidem. 
23 Janusz Korwin-Mikke, speech in the European Parliament, 8 September 2015, URL: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v7CQkivQNQI (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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coming to Europe do not want to work, and that by offering high benefits, the EU 
does not give them an incentive to do so.24 
Security issues crop up frequently in the public debate, although usually in 
combination with cultural issues. Islam is seen as a threat not only to identity, but 
also to Poles’ immediate security. During a debate in the Sejm, Robert Winnicki 
from the National Movement demanded “zero immigrants, zero refugees, zero 
terrorists in the Polish state”.25 Equating refugees with terrorists has become a 
permanent feature of the radical right’s rhetoric. In Kukiz’15’s declaration, we can 
read that “among immigrants, for example in Hungary, Islamic State militants have 
already been identified. There will be more and more of them, because they make 
it clear that their next objective is an ‘assault’ of terrorists on Europe. Europe has 
immersed itself in chaos and ethnic and religious conflicts”.26 Media reports on the 
New Year’s Eve attacks on women in certain cities in Germany also reverberated 
in Poland, with female MPs from Kukiz’15 and KORWiN writing a letter to Prime 
Minister Beata Szydło on 14 January 2016 stating that “the increase in the number 
of Islamic immigrants is linked to cases of harassment, attacks and rapes of wom-
en, which we shall not accept, we will not allow the safety of Polish women to be 
any kind of bargaining chip”.27 In 2016 a proposal was made to build a fence be-
tween Poland and Ukraine in order to protect the eastern border.28 
The next, and perhaps most visible issue is that of religious- and culture-based 
arguments – refugees, especially Muslims or those from countries where Islam is 
dominant, are seen as culturally different and unacceptable. Before the Second 
World War, Poland was a multicultural country populated by Poles, Jews, Ger-
mans, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Armenians, Tatars and Lemkos, among others. 
Following the border shifts, the Holocaust and mass population transfers, Poland 
became one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in Europe – today, 
94% of inhabitants see themselves as “ethnic Poles”29 and 93% declare themselves 
                                                     
24 Janusz Korwin-Mikke, speech in the European Parliament, 7 June 2016, URL: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IORwEe2fWQA (accessed 8 December 2017). 
25 Robert Winnicki, 15th session of the Sejm, 1 April 2016, 241. 
26 Position of the Kukiz’15 movement on “refugees”, op. cit. 
27 “Działaczki Kukiz’15 i KORWiN nie chcą w Polsce ani jednego ‘uchodźcy’! ‘Wzrost ilości 
imigrantów islamskich wiąże się z przypadkami molestowania, bicia i gwałcenia’”, wPolityce.pl, 14 
January 2016, URL: https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/278176-dzialaczki-kukiz15-i-korwin-nie-chca-w-
polsce-ani-jednego-uchodzcy-wzrost-ilosci-imigrantow-islamskich-wiaze-sie-z-przypadkami-
molestowania-bicia-i-gwalcenia (accessed 10 December 2017) 
28 “Ruch Narodowy chce ogrodzenia na granicy polsko-ukraińskiej”, Parlamentarny.pl, 25 
February 2016, URL: http://www.parlamentarny.pl/wydarzenia/ruch-narodowy-chce-ogrodzenia-
na-granicy-polsko-ukrainskiej,6077.html (accessed 12 December 2017). 
29 Wyniki Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludności i Mieszkań 2011, Warsaw, March 2012, URL: 
https://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/lu_nps2011_wyniki_nsp2011_22032012.pdf (accessed 12 
December 2017). 
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to be Catholics.30 For the radical right, this ethnic, cultural and religious uniformity 
of Poland is a virtue and a wealth that must be defended.31 Owing to this ethnic 
uniformity, as well as the country’s isolation during the years of communism, for-
eigners in Poland, especially those representing different cultures, are treated with 
reserve, and often also fear. The discourse based upon insisting on Catholicism as 
an intrinsic attribute of Polishness is also affected by the myth of Poland as 
Antemurale Christianitatis – the bulwark of Christendom – and Poland’s role in de-
fending Christian Europe from Eastern influence.32 The idea of Poland being the 
only country in the European Union to be founded on Christian values often ap-
pears in the statements of radical-right politicians. They regard Catholicism as the 
essence of Polishness and the foundation of Polish national identity, and hence in 
need of protection. This was what led the National Movement to stress during a 
plenary debate in the Sejm that “we want Poland to stay Christian (…) we don’t 
want the errors of multiculturalism Western Europe is making, and of which it is 
experiencing the tragic consequences”.33 During another debate, Kukiz’15 MP 
Anna-Maria Siarkowska said that Poles are “a hospitable nation, but don’t want 
culturally alien representatives of the civilisation of Islam, a civilisation that doesn’t 
assimilate, but imposes its way of life and thinking on others – it imposes its reli-
gion and its laws”.34 
The question of religion appears very frequently in the discourse, also in the 
context of whom we should help – there has been a proposal to help only Chris-
tian refugees, as those with whom Poles are connected by shared values. Here too, 
the argument was raised pointing to the primary needs of Poles living outside of 
the country – in Kazakhstan, Lithuania and Belarus. The Kukiz’15 leader’s declara-
tion emphasises that in Kazakhstan, Siberia and Ukraine there are “at least several 
tens of thousands of Poles and the descendants of Poles waiting for repatriation. 
There is no need to assimilate them, they won’t make terrorist attacks. And yet for 
25 years we have not brought them over”.35 This argument is also raised by other 
parties, including the ruling Law and Justice, who also point to the large number of 
citizens of Ukraine living in Poland as refugees from conflict-hit areas. 
The debate over the solution to the problem of refugees arriving in Europe al-
so became a forum for criticism of the institution of the European Union, which 
30 CBOS, Zmiany w zakresie wiary i religijności Polaków po śmierci Jana Pawła II (“Changes in the Belief 
and Religiosity of Poles since the Death of John Paul II”), Komunikat z badań BS/49/2012, 
Warszawa 2012. 
31 Robert Winnicki, Posiedzenie Sejmu, 9 February 2016, URL: https://videosejm.pl/video/
4787-posel-robert-winnicki-wystapienie-z-dnia-09-lutego-2016-roku (accessed 10 December 2017). 
32 Janusz Tazbir, Polska przedmurzem Europy, Warszawa: Twój styl, 2004. 
33 Robert Winnicki, 15th session of the Sejm, 1 April 2016, 242. 
34 Anna Siarkowska’s speech during Sejm session on 11 February 2016, video recording: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=33&v=S3nW-RWgNRw (accessed 14 December 
2017). 
35 Position of the Kukiz’15 movement on “refugees”, op. cit. 
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on the one hand is seen as ineffective, yet on the other hand is accused of exces-
sive interference in the internal affairs of member states. Most parties of the popu-
list radical right are Eurosceptic or hostile to the European Union, and the Polish 
example is no exception here. Both Kukiz’15 and the Congress of the New Right 
(as well as KORWiN) criticised the refugee relocation mechanism, and they were 
also active in passing the resolution in the Sejm rejecting mandatory relocation. 
Sylwester Chruszcz from Kukiz’15 supported the proposed resolution, maintaining 
that the Polish side would not agree to “the EU diktat imposing upon us by force a 
limit of citizens of third countries or stateless individuals”.36 He added that this 
position was in accordance with the Polish national interest, as “we are a sovereign 
state which itself decides upon issues fundamental to us”.37 The European Union 
is accused of lack of action to bring an end to the conflict in the Middle East, as 
well as providing insufficient aid in the countries in question. A common stance is 
the idea, included in the Kukiz’15 declaration, that refugees (the word “immigrant” 
is used in the declaration) “should be helped, but in the countries from which they 
come”, and that the EU ought to “provide active support for ending conflicts in 
such countries as Syria and Libya”.38 Kukiz believes that a “new Marshall Plan” 
should be proposed to the Middle East and North Africa.39 Criticism of the solu-
tions offered by the European Union has also become a motivation for collecting 
signatures for the initiative to hold a referendum, in which Kukiz’s movement 
wants to ask the question: “Are you in favour of Poland accepting ‘refugees’ within 
the relocation system in the European Union?”40 The programme of the KOR-
WiN party,41 founded after the split within the KNP, cites as the absolute priority 
of Poland’s foreign policy “regaining the possibility of making sovereign decisions 
on Poland’s immigration policy”,42 refusing to countenance the interference of the 
European Commission in Poland’s internal affairs. The Congress, the only Polish 
party to advocate abolition of the European Union, announced in 2014 that it 
would vote against all initiatives in the European Parliament aiming to increase the 
competences of EU institutions, and thus against all community initiatives.43 In a 
controversial speech in the European Parliament, Korwin-Mikke criticised the 
Dublin Regulation, comparing refugee camps to concentration camps and claiming 
                                                     
36 Artur Bartkiewicz, “Sejm za uchwałą odrzucającą przymusową relokację uchodźców w UE”, 
in Rzeczpospolita 21 October 2016 URL: http://www.rp.pl/Uchodzcy/161029860-Sejm-za-uchwala-
odrzucajaca-przymusowa-relokacje-uchodzcow-w-UE.html (accessed 8 December 2017). 
37 Ibidem. 
38 Position of the Kukiz’15 movement on “refugees”, op. cit. 
39 Ibidem. 
40 Referendum Day webpage, URL: http://dzienreferendalny.pl (accessed 6 December 2017). 
41 The KORWiN party changed its name to Wolność (Liberty) on 8 October 2016. 
42 Dumna, Bogata Polska, Program Partii KORWiN Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja, 
Warszawa 17 October 2015. 
43 Programme of the Congress of the New Right (2014). 
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that EU policy is one leading to “Europe being flooded with human garbage […] 
that does not want to work”; this policy, he argues, will lead to the “downfall of 
Europe”.44 
Conclusions 
Contemporary Polish identity is based on culture, language and religion, and par-
ticularly the last of these played an important role in the time when the Polish na-
tion was subjected to external oppression (the partitions and the communist peri-
od). The Catholic Church has often been perceived as the guardian of Polish iden-
tity as well as the bastion of freedom. It is therefore no surprise that arguments 
about endangered identity are cited in the debate on accepting refugees or the 
common EU migration policy. The fear of outsiders, often representing a different 
religion and culture, is fomented and reinforced by the discourse of the populist 
radical right. As Krastev notes, this type of rhetoric “exploits and strengthens the 
sense of division into ‘ordinary citizens’ and the ‘elite’, which only safeguards its 
own interests”.45 In these conditions, success is enjoyed by parties and their leaders 
who succeed in persuading society about the existence of a threat, as well as their 
commitment to defending ordinary citizens, their identity, way of life and well-
being. Analysis of the rhetoric of radical right-wing parties in Poland leads to the 
conclusion that both economic arguments and those related to security have an 
extra agenda in the form of identity-based arguments. Activists of the radical right 
view ethnic and religious uniformity as a virtue. In order to be accepted, refugees 
should be the same as inhabitants of the country in which they are arriving. As a 
result, if one is to even consider accepting them, then this should only be on con-
dition that they must be Christians. Islam is presented as “the other”, a threat for 
Polish and European identity, and the migration crisis is interpreted as an attempt-
ed “invasion of Europe”, an alien civilisation attempting to take control. The Eu-
ropean Union is criticised for approaching the crisis too liberally, for its excessive 
openness and undue protection of its citizens, as well as for its misguided policy of 
multiculturalism, which, according to the radical right, results in ethnic ghettos and 
terrorist attacks. The Polish radical right therefore has the mission to safeguard not 
only Polish society from Islamisation, but also Europe. This is the subject of one 
of the points in the Congress of the New Right’s programme: “we believe that only 
restoration of European values – Latin Civilisation and Western Universalism – 
can change the present Europe under occupation of the EU from an area of per-
manent crisis into a space of freedom, well-being and the principles that once built 
the power of the Old Continent”.46 The new Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz 
44 Janusz Korwin-Mikke, speech in the European Parliament, 8 September 2015, URL: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v7CQkivQNQI (accessed 8 December 2017). 
45 Ivan Krastev, “The strange death”, op. cit. p. 60. 
46 Programme of the Congress of the New Right (2014). 
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Morawiecki, has also joined this rhetoric, speaking of the need for the re-
Christianisation of Europe.47 
A characteristic of the radical right in Eastern Europe is mainstream parties’ 
tendency to appropriate their rhetoric; this occurs in Hungary (where Fidesz 
adopted some of Jobbik’s xenophobic rhetoric),48 as well as in Poland, where the 
ruling Law and Justice party often uses exactly the same arguments against ac-
ceptance of relocation of refugees as Paweł Kukiz and Korwin-Mikke. An example 
might be the statement of Foreign Affairs Minister Witold Waszczykowski, who 
asserted that Poland could potentially accept Christian refugees, as only they would 
have the chance for assimilation. Commenting on the EU Justice Tribunal’s deci-
sion pronouncing that the refugee relocation mechanism is a legitimately adopted 
EU law binding in all countries (including Poland), Waszczykowski stated that it is 
not refugees who are in question, but economic immigrants. 
The rhetoric of the radical right, through the simplicity and clarity of its mes-
sage and with the help of the (especially social) media, reaches a broad range of 
recipients and influences their perception of the migration crisis and solutions 
proposed by the European Union. This rhetoric influences not only the radicalisa-
tion of the language of politics, but also attitudes in society, leading to acts of phys-
ical violence.49 This causes profound social division in Poland, but the question 
also divides European societies and has an impact on EU unity. In 2016, Ivan 
Krastev said of the divisions that opened up in the EU before the recent crises: 
“the financial crisis split the EU into creditors and debtors, tearing open a divide 
between north and south. Now the refugee crisis is dividing Europe between East 
and West […] We are not just experiencing a lack of solidarity […] we are experi-
encing the clash of conflicting solidarities: between national, ethnic and religious 
solidarity and our duty as human beings”.50 It seems that it will not be easy to head 
off the crisis over the failure to secure acceptance for the decision to relocate some 
refugees, especially after the European Commission’s decision in 2017 to refer 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the European Court of Justice.  
 
                                                     
47 Mateusz Morawiecki, interview for TV Trwam, 8 December 2017, URL: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ng4nkvx6Yy4 (accessed 14 December 2017). 
48 Lenka Bustikova, “The Radical Right”, op. cit. 
49 According to a report on the OKO.press website, in Poland in 2016 record numbers of hate 
crimes were recorded, meaning those motivated by supposed religion, nationality, sexual orientation 
or skin colour. URL: https://oko.press/waszczykowski-powtarza-przekaz-pis-uchodzcy-czyli-
migranci-czyli-terror-a-przeciez-przyjmujemy-ukraincow/ (accessed 8 December 2017). 
50 “Refugee crisis: ‘Not the same values in East and West’”, Die Welt, 8 March 2016, URL: 
http://www.dw.com/en/refugee-crisis-not-the-same-values-in-east-and-west/a-19102868 (accessed 
8 December 2017). 
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